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CHAPTER IX

THE NATIONAL STATE AS INTRUDER AND REFORMER

In Dragalevtsy, as in agricultural villages throughout the world, the national state was building up a loyalty in competition with the unquestioned loyalty people used to give to their family group and their community. The spread of the government-sponsored school, though its scientific teachings were elementary, weakened the hold of the formalistic, institutionalized religion which went along with a familistic society. Because of the school there was increased conflict between the older and younger generations.

Not only in time of war but also in time of peace the national government had been calling its young men to leave their plows and their cattle to take up pick or rifle. The *trudovatsi* handled the picks, and those in military training the rifles.

After the first World War Bulgaria initiated an ambitious program of compulsory labor as a substitute for military training, formerly required. The original plan called for service from both young men and young women. Recruiting of women later ceased for they proved unsuited to the system. The young men of the country were enrolled in labor camps where they performed their *trudova* (compulsory labor). Each young *trudovak* was required to serve eight months, though for two thousand leva, or less than $25, he could buy himself off at the end of six months. Some young men paid a total ranging from 9,000 leva to 32,000 leva, according to their economic status, to be entirely exempted from service.

The *trudovatsi* built many highways and bridges, and worked without pay in government shops, factories, and lumber plants. Their achievements were significant although much of this potential man power was unused or misused because of the lack of sufficient engineers to give proper direction to the work.

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The *trudova* system existed in principle until Bulgaria joined the Axis, though, she like all countries defeated in the first World War, passed through a period when compulsory labor was gradually replaced by compulsory military service. After the *coup d'état* of May, 1934, various groups of army officers controlled many of the country's policies; so it was not surprising to learn of the strengthening of the military forces of the nation. One sign of the government's changed policy was the fact that in 1935 not a single young man from Dragalevtsy went as a *trudovak*, but sixteen were called to do military service. Those eligible for service were called before a commission of army officers and examined; the successful ones passed on to receive military training, and the rest were returned home. Those who were rejected lost some standing in the eyes of the villagers, because it was thought that they had inherited some family weakness. The *family* rather than the individual was blamed.

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There was undeniably a great influence exercised upon the village by the practice of taking young men, in their impressionable years, away from the village for an interval of several months. They lived in an army barracks or a *trudovak* camp with other young men from different parts of the country. For a time they ceased doing some things which the village thought essential, and they learned to do other things which older family members would perhaps have frowned upon. They went out from a family system where each member worked more or less as a part of the whole; they returned often very conscious of their own individuality, and had to pass through a process of reconditioning before the early customs, habits, and patterns of thought once more closed about them. There were some individuals who never again fell completely into line and who turned to Sofia for employment and a more congenial atmosphere.

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Older men who returned to the village as retired noncommissioned officers enjoyed a certain prestige that lingered after brass buttons and clumping boots had been exchanged for the conventional village attire. On the wall of the office of the Village Clerk, the names of all local officials and public employees were posted. There was considerable information regarding each man, but the concluding and perhaps most important item was the statement of the person's service

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to the State, either as a soldier or a *trudovak*. All had served in one of these capacities, else they would not have been employed.

The young men were the only ones called to leave the village. As for the rest of the people, the national government went to them in the persons of its civil servants, who comprised most of the intelligentsia. Even the priest was a government employee, since the state supported the church. The doctor received most of her salary from public funds, since private practice in a village would have been financially unrewarding. In addition to these, the veterinarian, the schoolteachers, and an occasional lecturer from outside formed the advance guard of the national State. All of these public servants knew that they would be held accountable by their supervisors or inspectors, and identified themselves much more readily with the national bureaucracy than with the peasants whom they were supposed to help. Of these, the mayor was the spearhead in the attack on the old ways. One of his duties was to preside over the village court, where he stood for the law and order of the land.

One day as I was leaving the office of the mayor he asked me to stay and attend court. I sat in the corner of the room next to a bookcase jammed with documents. The mayor sat behind his desk, covered on such occasions by the white, green, and red Bulgarian flag, on which there was a stack of folders, one for each case to be heard. On the wall over his head were pictures of the King and Queen, a beautifully colored coat of arms of Bulgaria, and a patriotic calendar. Through the window I could see the small memorial garden in which forty-four fruit trees had been planted in memory of the forty-four local sons killed in the battles of Bulgaria's several wars. Two rifles for use when the policemen were on patrol stood in the gun rack not far from the desk. A bench lined another wall close to the small cast-iron stove. Near me there was a hat rack, and a spittoon less popular than the floor. A muddy, unshaven policeman stood at the door to bark people in and out.

The first man to come in was Iliya Trunin, a thirty-two year old villager in a *kozhuh* (sheepskin coat), who was being sued by Ivan Katsarov, a tavern keeper. Iliya, instead of going to the expense of running an electric line from the main electric cable, had arranged

105 The Bulgarian case seems particularly apropos for such a study. Unlike Czarist Russia or the countries of Asia, pre-Communist Bulgaria had developed a relatively free and advanced society. Within the framework of a most liberal and democratic constitution, of a social structure without any noticeable class differences and of a predominantly agricultural economy based on independent small landholdings, Bulgaria [162] had produced a social legislation among the most progressive of our time. Native intelligentsia and labor alike represented only about 20 per cent of the population and were nothing more than recent offspring of the nation's backbone—the peasantry—so that no logical conflict of interests had a chance ● 466 to develop in Bulgaria. Labor, in particular, 461 had attained, as early as the twenties, the status of free labor with all necessary requisites, such as freedom of professional organization, free collective bargaining and impartial settlement of labor disputes, the right to strike, freedom of choosing and changing job, and a firm legal protection, including social security. In fact, by 1924, Bulgaria had incorporated into her domestic legislation all recommendations of the International Labor Office of the League of Nations.*

668 In such a harmonious environment, Communism could not and did not have any chance of success. Still, Communist attempts to artificially create a "social problem" and exploit it for their own purposes go way back to the turn of the century, when, in 1903, a small group of Lenin's followers split from the Bulgarian Social-Democratic Party and formed a radical-revolutionary nucleus, known later

113 *For detailed background information and source material, see author's study *Trade Unions and Labor Legislation in Bulgaria (1879-1953)* (New York: Mid-European Studies Center, 1953).

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The Communist experiment with Bulgaria is now ten years old. The evidence at hand is deemed more than sufficient for substantiating a case, with particular regard to labor law and relations.

In analyzing our primary source of evidence—Bulgaria's labor legislation—a sequence of important premises should be constantly borne in mind. The Bulgarian Communist Party, which is the one and only element of power, has fully subscribed to the theory and practice of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It has termed its form of government a "people's democracy" which "fulfills the functions of the dictatorship of the proletariat."[3] According to Lenin, the dictatorship of the proletariat represents "a power limited by nothing, by no law, directly based on violence."[4] It is, therefore, difficult, if at all possible, to take even Communist legislation at its face value, when it is known that the law is not binding on the highest repository of power—the Communist Party and government. Still, the existing legislation can be safely considered as the expression of a "minimum of violence" (the way toward the maximum being left open) and, as such, will necessarily reflect the guiding principles of Bulgarian labor law and relations.

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Another important premise is the Communist identification of party and government with the "working class" and the establishment of government ownership over capital and means of production. From labor's point of view, this situation means that in practice the workers are employees of a single owner—the Communist government—yet in theory are owners of their place of work and employers of themselves. This obvious nonsense has a definite purpose: to make impossible any "contrast" between capital and labor and, thus, to place the whole labor force under absolute governmental control. That is why "strike" is an unknown term in Communist labor law (you cannot strike against yourself), its equivalent having been identified as a capital

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(Footnote 4 continued)
insufficiently clarified. For details, see Michael Padev, *Dimitrov Wastes No Bullets* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), Ch. VI; William B. King and Frank O'Brien, *The Balkans* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), pp. 137-139; and author's study cited at footnote 3, pp. 11-14.

[3] Georgi Dimitrov, *Political Report to the 5th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party* (Sofia: 1949), in Bulgarian, p. 122.

[4] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (Moscow: 1930), Vol. 9, Second Russian Edition, p. 95, in Russian.

[5] Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria of 1947, full English translation in Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe* (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1949), Appendix, pp. 323-339.

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crime against the state and put within the proscription of Communist criminal law. Any transgression on the part of a worker is, therefore, a direct offense against the state authority. It is easily understandable why Communist criminal law has engulfed the great part of matters which usually pertain to labor legislation, and why even the latter is punitive rather than protective in character.

The basic legal documents related to labor law and relations in Communist Bulgaria are the constitution,[7] the Code of Labor[8] and the Statute of the Trade Unions.[9] They, of course, are supplemented by various acts which, according to the Communist doctrine of "normative acts,"[10] can and do supersede previous legislation, no matter what governmental body originated them.

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According to the constitution, labor, besides being "a right," is "a duty and a point of honor for every able-bodied citizen. It is the duty of every citizen to engage in socially useful labor and to work according to his powers and ability."[11] Of course, it is the government which enforces the observance of this constitutional norm and establishes the "social utility" of the work done. In practice, "the duty to work" is exemplified in the complete regimentation of Bulgaria's labor force.

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Two governmental agencies, the Office of Labor Cadres and the Main Board of Labor Reserves, are especially entrusted with the registration, distribution, recruitment and complete control of all available manpower from 14 years of age upward. Their basic tasks are, in Communist language, "to register the available labor force by finding and keeping at hand, through registration, all employed and unemployed workers; to find them appropriate jobs and, with respect to the fulfillment of the Five-Year Economic Plan, to meet the needs of the industrial, constructional, and other enterprises by guaranteeing to them the necessary manpower . . . . Workers who leave their jobs arbitrarily and without excusable

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[7] *Izvestiya na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobranje*, Year II, No. 91, November 13, 1951, in Bulgarian.

[8] *Ustav na Professionalnite Suyuzi v Narodnata Republika Bulgaria* (Statute of the Trade Unions in the People's Republic Bulgaria), approved by the Third Congress of the Bulgarian trade unions, December, 1951 (Sofia: *Profizdat*, 1952), in Bulgarian.

[9] In Communist jurisprudence, any act of a central governmental authority prevails upon preceding legislation, without distinction of formal superiority. The "doctrine of normative acts" is summarized in United States Department of Labor bulletin cited at footnote 1, pp. 5 and 6.

[10] Art. 73.

464 reasons, and thereby affect the labor discipline and the fulfillment of the production plans of the enterprises, have to be reported to the Office of Labor Mobilization . . . ."[25] The Board of Labor Reserves, in particular, obtains manpower "in two ways: through organized drafting of manpower from villages and towns—these persons will go directly into production—and through the preparation of skilled labor cadres in the schools for labor reserves."[26]

●466 681 It should be clear that the Communist authorities not only decide a youth's profession for good but they also deprive any Bulgarian worker of even an elementary freedom of choice and movement. A Bulgarian citizen must either submit to the governmental labor agencies or be "mobilized" for work by the Office of Labor Mobilization. Further disobedience leads to confinement to "labor-educational work," that is, forced labor camps, under the Law on the People's Militia[27] or to punishments under the Penal Code. The desire for complete control over the labor force is further evidenced by the elimination of any unemployment insurance from Bulgaria's social legislation.

466 [671] But the full captivity of the Bulgarian worker appears even clearer when one considers some of the provisions of the Labor Code as well as some supplementary legislation. Thus, Article 26 of the code officially sanctioned the right of the government to transfer workers and employees "to a different work in the same or another enterprise or in another locality, even without their consent, on order by the respective minister." And Article 2 of the Law for Establishing Stability of the Labor Force in the Enterprises and Offices[28] explicitly prohibited "the arbitrary quitting of the job," under threat of heavy penalties in Article 4, such as imprisonment for up to four months or corrective labor for up to one year, if no greater offense of the Penal Code is envisaged. These acts violate a basic human

[25] Newspaper *Izgrev*, March 8, 1951 (Bulgarian).

[26] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Worker's Deed), organ of the Bulgarian Communist Party, May 14, 1952 (Bulgarian). The Board was created by Ordinance No. 190 of the Council of Ministers, in *Izvestiya na Prezidiuma na Narodnato Sobranje*, Year III, No. 45, April 28, 1952.

[27] *Durzhaven Vestnik*, No. 69, March 25, 1948 (Bulgarian). For details on Bulgarian forced labor legislation and practice, cf. Roger N. Baldwin, ed., *A New Slavery* (New York: Oceana Publications, 1953), chapter on Bulgaria based on author's research. See also United Nations, *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour* (Geneva: E/2431, 1953).

185] The administration [vocational rehabilitation] program provides that during 1955, 70 thousand persons would be rehabilitated, 100 thousand in 1956, and the number would be progressively increased until 1959 some 200 thousand disabled persons would be rehabilitated and returned to useful work.—James P. Mitchell

466 right of freedom on the job and a legal principle requesting mutual consent for any modification of existing conditions."[28]

The check upon the workers' movement is performed via so-called "personal passports" and "workbooks." The first, issued by the police and the second by the first employer are labelled "official documents" and must be presented on request. According to the provisions of the Labor Code, as well as of the special Decree for Workbooks,[29] every worker is required to present his workbook, in order to be eligible for any kind of job. The book contains the whole employment record and, specifically, "the reason for the discontinuation" of a previous job.[30] It is kept by the employer and is aimed primarily at the prevention of arbitrary quitting.

471 Before discussing the core of labor relations—collective bargaining—it is important to recall the main characteristics of the parties between which the bargaining is supposed to take place. Due to the complete disappearance of private ownership in industry, the one and only owner and employer in Bulgaria is the Communist state. And bargaining with the state, even if duly protected, is always burdensome, especially when such protection is entirely lacking. In fact, Bulgaria's form of government being that of a dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, "a power limited by nothing . . . directly based on violence,"[31] and the sole repository of power being the Communist Party and government, all protective in-

[28] *Izvestiya na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobranje*, Year IV, No. 14, February 17, 1953.
[29] The Bulgarian Communists themselves seem to have been embarrassed by the shockingly frank language of the Stability Law (cf. author's study cited at footnote 3, p. 20, quoting speech by Vice-President Yugov), so that they repealed it nine months later (*Izvestiya na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobranje*, Year IV, No. 90, November 10, 1953). No change in the actual situation has been reported, however.
[30] *Izvestiya na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobranje*, Year IV, No. 26, March 31, 1953.
[31] Art. 17, par. 2 of the Labor Code, and Art. 6 (g) of the Decree for Workbooks.
[32] See footnote 6.

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467 acy can be . . . their constantly teaching the working class that the only correct road is the organization of patriotic socialist competitions and the fulfillment of the state economic plans."[*] And the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party[**] added that "the most important role of the trade unions in a proletarian dictatorship is their organizational-economic and educational role—their role as schools of communism."

It seems obvious that trade unions in a democratic country and their Communist counterpart have absolutely nothing in common except their name. In fact, their nature, functions and aims are diametrically opposed to each other. In Bulgaria, they are channels of the Communist government and can be best compared with an economic police force, operating in factories and other places where the economic plans of the government are being implemented.

How, then, is it at all possible to speak about collective bargaining, when the two contracting parties are, in last analysis, representatives of one and the same Communist state authority? Still, the Bulgarian Communists persist in using the term "collective" or "individual labor contract,"[***] although in theory as well as in practice they exclude any conflict-of-interest matters from contractual regulation. Following the Soviet example, even wages and standards of output are excluded as subjects of bargaining and reserved for exclusive governmental regulation. Wages in Communist Bulgaria are determined on the basis of "labor norms"—that is, production quotas—prescribed by the government for each category of workers. If a worker is not able to fulfill his norm, he is paid according to the quantity and quality of the finished product. This piece-work system is the antipode of the system of hourly wages and was banished in 1905 as a remnant of Turkish feudalism.[†] Thus, the Bulgarian Government is absolute master in decreeing all important labor

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Preustroyavaneto na Sotsializma v Nas (Sofia: 1951), p. 88, in Bulgarian.

[**] Cf. Pt. II, Ch. I and II of the Code of Labor.

[***] Indicative of Communist hypocrisy is the fact that, before 1905, the Bulgarian Communists were bitter opponents of the piece-work system, even for shoemakers, denouncing it as "the most detestable exploitation by the hyenas of private capitalism." Ivan Iliev, *Rabotnicheskite Sindikalno Dvizhenije v Bulgaria* (Sofia: 1927), p. 87, in Bulgarian. Communists everywhere, if out of power, violently oppose piece-work, yet introduce and hail it as "the most progressive achievement of the socialist state," once they take over.

466 656 conditions of the alleged individual or collective "agreements," without any negotiation on the part of the workers. Actually, the "labor contract" represents a model form, prepared in advance by the government, and submitted for signature to the labor arm of the government—the trade union committee—thus legally binding all workers to a document in the formulation of which they have not at all participated.

468 656 The secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Chankov, calls the labor contract an "economic-political document . . . a means for the mobilization of the working class for the fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan" and frankly states that "the job of the trade unions with respect to the collective labor contracts by no means ends with the unions' task to sign the contracts. In fact, it starts only then. The most important aspect of their function is that, after the contracts have been signed, the trade unions exercise uninterrupted control and criticism of the administration of the contracts and mobilize the workers and employees for the contracts' fulfillment."[*]

It is obvious that those "contracts" represent nothing but a legally enforceable document with which the government imposes one-sided obligations upon the Bulgarian workers. The only consideration of the Communists in resorting to them seems to be their desire to give the outside world the impression of free labor relations within the Soviet orbit.

The provisions related to the settlement of labor disputes are also symptomatic in this respect. While using the term "labor disputes," the Bulgarian Communists not only shrink its subject matter to predominantly technical problems on the factory level, but also proclaim the supremacy of the executive over the judiciary in settling the disputes.[*] In practice, the dispute seldom leaves the first stage, the so-called conciliatory commission, composed of the persons who signed the collective agreements and reflecting the identical source of authority—the Communist government. It seldom happens, therefore, that the representatives of the government-employer and of the government-controlled committee are allowed

[*] Work cited at footnote 24, pp. 54-55.

671 [*] Cf. Pt. II, Ch. IX of the Code of Labor. Also, supplementary decrees in *Izvestiya na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobranje*, Nos. 38, May 9, 1952, and 47, June 3, 1952. Art. 143 of the Code, in particular, prohibits appeals to conciliation boards and courts for disputes involving disciplinary punishments or dismissal by the trade union or the governmental authori-

468 656 to disagree on the settlement of a labor dispute. If they should, the last word is explicitly reserved for the executive.

The collapse of collective bargaining and the regimentation of the labor force have restricted labor relations to technical questions and have transformed labor law into a means for enforcing governmental policy. The key institution of the Communist system vis-à-vis labor has become the so-called socialist discipline of labor.

● 466 656 "Socialist labor discipline" represents a system of rules affecting the conduct of the workers in any Communist enterprise, office or organization. Its aim is to increase production and productivity of labor without any particular regard to the real capacities of the national economy and of the labor force, including the individual worker. Within the limits of a governmentally recruited, directed and controlled labor force, "socialist labor discipline" embraces all regulations enacted by the Communist administration of every establishment which fix the specific obligations of the workers. In short, it is the regime under which the worker must perform his daily work, to which he is assigned and which he cannot leave.

It has been said that labor remuneration in Communist Bulgaria is based on the piece-work system. Accordingly, the primary requirement of the administration is that the worker fulfills his daily norm in order to get his full wage. But since norms are established by the State Institute for Labor Norms on the basis of the capacity of 5 to 10 per cent of the most productive workers, the remaining 90 to 95 per cent are driven to catch up by the rigorous labor discipline."

466 671 The only possible way to reach the norm is to work more. That is why Article 43 of the Labor Code announces a "nonfixed working day" and Article 46(a) to (f) allows overtime work for a variety of purposes, in spite of general provisions to the contrary in Articles 39 and 43. The Decree for Overtime Work[9] dispels possible doubts by stating, in its Article 11, that "workers and employees cannot refuse . . . to perform overtime work. If they think that the imposed overtime work is unlawful, they

ties. In such cases the worker or employee may only appeal to higher administrative authorities.

[7] Cf. Leland Stowe, *Conquest by Terror* (New York: Random House, 1952), p. 135. While norms are constantly revised and increased, wages remain almost the same, so that, in 1951 alone, there was an automatic wage reduction of up to 25 per cent (p. 136).

[8] Text of decree in *Trud*, May 13, 1952.

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should report to the committee without discontinuing their work." The decree declares two hours overtime is "lawful," so that the working day in Bulgaria usually consists of ten hours, six days a week, and neither the recesses nor even the time when the workers are paid are included in the working time.[28] Furthermore, "it is an archaic damaging tradition for some workers to be absent from work during religious holidays."[29] And Article 79 of the Labor Code regulates the labor remuneration in cases of work on Sundays and the seven official holidays in a year, thus rendering any day of the year a potential, and usually an actual, working day. A Communist source itself admitted that Bulgarian enterprises "regularly use overtime work and deprive the workers of their week ends."[30]

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Usually, overtime work does not help to fulfill or overfulfill the norm either. But even if it does, the quest for more production and productivity of labor never stops. The principal means for extracting a maximum effort from the workers are the so-called socialist competitions or emulations. They represent officially staged contests between individual workers or among plants to "overfulfill" the established norms. The cruelty of this system lies in the fact that as "competitions" are labelled "voluntary," no worker can claim overtime pay. Furthermore, competitions lead inexorably to the establishment of higher quotas and automatically lower the piece rates of even the general wage level.

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"Socialist competition has become a law of the socialist society and has turned into one of the most important methods for Communist education of the working people, an instrument for making them participate in the governmental build-up and the process of production," the Soviet Encyclopedia frankly states.[31] That Communist Bulgaria follows the identical path is plainly evident from the words of the president of the Bulgarian trade unions, Prakhov, who, in 1951, proclaimed "socialist competitions" as "a permanent system for building socialism" and gave the number of participants at "about 70 per cent" of all Bulgarian workers.[32]

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Within the framework of this almost suicidal drive for ever-increasing daily per-

[28] Art. 49, par. 3, and Art. 71 of the Code of Labor.
[29] *Trud*, December 27, 1951.
[30] *Trud*, October 10, 1951.
[31] *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Encyclopediya*, 2d Ed., Vol. 14; *Disciplina Trudoj*, in Russian.

[204] After metal type for printing has been "set" on a machine like the one whose keyboard is shown on the cover, the type is "locked up" in "chases" on a "stone," which means that it is fastened into a rectangular frame on a table. When the letter-press method is used, the type then goes directly to a press.

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formance, the "socialist labor discipline" represents the most immediate threat facing the worker on the job. Its most important features are absenteeism and inefficiency. Thus, a Bulgarian worker violates the labor discipline and may incur disciplinary or court punishment when he is absent from work, when he is late for work, when he leaves work prematurely, or when he is not efficient enough during his working day."[30] The disciplinary punishment imposed by the administration of the enterprise may range from a warning, reprimand, severe reprimand or transfer, to a lower-paid job in the same or a different enterprise, or dismissal.[31] With the exhaustion of the disciplinary punishments the way is open for criminal prosecution, either under the new Penal Code or under the Law of the People's Militia.[32]

Immediate dismissal is imposed when the worker is "negligent toward his obligations" or "comes to work in evidently drunken condition" and also when he is "absent from work without valid reasons for more than half of a working day as well as late for more than

[30] *Trud*, December 17, 1951.
[31] Cf. Art. 128 of the Labor Code.
[32] Cf. Art. 130 of the Labor Code.
[33] Penal Code in *Izvestiya na Narodnoto Sobranje*, No. 13, February 13, 1951. Law on the People's Militia, cited at footnote 14.

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> The Soviet trade unions generally supervise the carrying out of the plans for the construction of dwellings and communal buildings and take part in the distribution of new buildings to the workers, and in this connection their proposals have a decisive importance.—Leonid Nikolaevich Solovyov, Secretary, All-Union Central Council of Trades Unions, USSR.

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half an hour more than twice a month."[45] It should be understood that the minimum consequence of a dismissal is labor mobilization.

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The following remarks of an authority on Soviet labor have full validity for Communist Bulgaria as well: "The fear of being late became a nightmare to workers, many of whom had no watches or clocks, and sent them speeding to work in frantic haste. The same fear made them gulp their lunch as quickly as possible."[46] It sounds unbelievable that such a casual infraction as tardiness can ultimately lead to imprisonment or forced labor.

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As to inefficiency, the recently enacted Decree for Payment of Dead Time and Rejects in Industry, Construction and Transport[47] supplemented the disciplinary punishments of the Labor Code by introducing financial liability for stoppage and defective output. The most unusual feature represents the fact that a worker is deprived of up to 30 per cent of his wage even if he is not responsible for the stoppage or defective output."[48]

This Communist anomaly is even more clear in the provisions regulating the financial responsibility for damages caused to the enterprise. Guided by the principle that "socialist property" is more precious than

[45] Grounds for dismissal in Art. 38 of the Labor Code.

[46] Work by Schwarz, cited at footnote 1, p. 105.

[47] *Izvestiya na Presidiuma na Narodnoto Sobranje*, No. 32, April 21, 1953.

[48] Art. 2 and 7 of the Decree for Payment of Dead Time and Rejects.

[49] Cf. Arts. 1 and 51 of the Penal Code of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic (*Ugolovnyi Kodex RSFSR*, in Russian). Also, Arts. 1 and 31 of the Bulgarian Penal Code of 1951.

[50] Art. 98 of the Labor Code.

[51] Cf. Art. 2 of the Penal Code.

[52] Art. 206, par. 2 of the Labor Code.

[53] This complete disregard for tradition and objective conditions has so much disorganized the national economy and antagonized the

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465 human life and that the "social harm" of an offense is all that matters," Communist legislation makes a worker "responsible for an amount higher than the actually caused damages," " besides, of course, his liability under criminal law.

It is evident that all these financial liability provisions not only reduce the already very low wages of the Bulgarian workers but also violate internationally accepted legal principles—such as the exclusion of liability exceeding actual damage or of liability without guilt or negligence. This is not surprising if one bears in mind that the Bulgarian Penal Code also recognizes the application of the principle of analogy in criminal law," and the Labor Code proclaims the principle that "acts of indictment have the force of proof until the contrary is proven" "—that is, one is presumed guilty unless he proves his innocence.

172 46 466 185 Analysis of labor and relations in Communist Bulgaria leads to the conclusion that the Bulgarian labor pattern is a carbon copy of the Soviet original. Neither democratic traditions nor social harmony have been taken into consideration. In their blind imitation, the Bulgarian Communists are trying to change the very basis of Bulgarian economy—from agriculture to heavy industry—as if they were mightier than the very nature which deprived the country of the elements required for such a transformation. Their only guiding light is the Soviet example, no matter how detrimental its application on Bulgarian soil might be."

000 The Bulgarian case—most suitable to test Communism in export—has brutally refuted any illusion that Communism can be "different" if applied in more advanced societies. The tragic paradox of the Communist experiment with the Bulgarian workers is that the alleged primary beneficiaries of the new "socialist order" have, instead, received the harshest possible deal. [The End]

661 461 population that purges of scapegoats and acts of dispair have been a permanent feature in Bulgaria as well. The workers, in particular, have defied pointed guns during the recent open unrest in Plovdiv, the second largest Bulgarian city, and in many other cities (Pleven, Peruik, Hashovo, Gorna Dubnmaja). In order to prevent the worst, the government, under Moscow's guidance, has announced a so-called new course, consisting of promises to raise the living standard and to relax the socialist labor discipline. The implementation of these promises is still to come. They clearly imply, however, that the Communist experiment has not succeeded in either converting the Bulgarian workers to Communism or breaking their spirit of resistance. (For details, see work cited at footnote 29, Ch. VIII-X.)

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465 human life and that the "social harm" of an offense is all that matters," Communist legislation makes a worker "responsible for an amount higher than the actually caused damages," " besides, of course, his liability under criminal law.

It is evident that all these financial liability provisions not only reduce the already very low wages of the Bulgarian workers but also violate internationally accepted legal principles—such as the exclusion of liability exceeding actual damage or of liability without guilt or negligence. This is not surprising if one bears in mind that the Bulgarian Penal Code also recognizes the application of the principle of analogy in criminal law," and the Labor Code proclaims the principle that "acts of indictment have the force of proof until the contrary is proven" "—that is, one is presumed guilty unless he proves his innocence.

177 .45 466 185 Analysis of labor and relations in Communist Bulgaria leads to the conclusion that the Bulgarian labor pattern is a carbon copy of the Soviet original. Neither democratic traditions nor social harmony have been taken into consideration. In their blind imitation, the Bulgarian Communists are trying to change the very basis of Bulgarian economy—from agriculture to heavy industry—as if they were mightier than the very nature which deprived the country of the elements required for such a transformation. Their only guiding light is the Soviet example, no matter how detrimental its application on Bulgarian soil might be."

600 The Bulgarian case—most suitable to test Communism in export—has brutally refuted any illusion that Communism can be "different" if applied in more advanced societies. The tragic paradox of the Communist experiment with the Bulgarian workers is that the alleged primary beneficiaries of the new "socialist order" have, instead, received the harshest possible deal. [The End]

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461 461 population that purges of scapegoats and acts of dispair have been a permanent feature in Bulgaria as well. The workers, in particular, have defied pointed guns during the recent open unrest in Plovdiv, the second largest Bulgarian city, and in many other cities (Pleven, Pernik, Haskovo, Gorna Dzhumaja). In order to prevent the worst, the government, under Moscow's guidance, has announced a so-called new course, consisting of promises to raise the living standard and to relax the socialist labor discipline. The implementation of these promises is still to come. They clearly imply, however, that the Communist experiment has not succeeded in either converting the Bulgarian workers to Communism or breaking their spirit of resistance. (For details, see work cited at footnote 29, Ch. VIII-X.)

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8: Bojkoff K-4, 5 (no date) 1946 EE1 Bulgaria EE1

433 **48. Industry.** Naturally, the industry of Bulgaria is still in its budding state. Its development, however, is not artificial, but is determined by the vital needs of the country. Here are some figures (production and solded goods in millions of leva):

	1937	*1938*	*1939*
Mines:			
Number of men-days	2,165.230	2.564.321	2.805.502
Production	495.107	573.086	648.318
Manifacture of raw materials:			
Number of men-days	21.885.257	22.188.657	21.862.592
Goods sold	10.400.032	11.045.943	11.197.577
of which:			
Ceramics:			
Numer of men-days	1.218.806	1.317.019	1.440.678
Produstion	391.138	414.820	490.986
Textile production:			
Number of men-days	7.664.945	7.612.326	7.993.641
Producfion	2.987.025	2.985.340	3.318.399
Food production:			
Number of men-days	8.936.974	8.689.685	7.754.672
Production	4.439.485	4.878.315	5.127.181
Electricity.			
Number of men-days	353.469	390.423	424.858
Production	405.863	430.259	477.760
Furs, hides, skin industry:			
Number of men-days	313.336	320.908	347.673
Production	351.124	296.552	351.138

Coal mining for 1939:		
State mines	metr. tons	1.731.000
Private mines	" "	492.000
Distributton of coal:		
For domestic purposes (heating)		35 %
" industrial "		33 %
" the railroads		32 %

466 **49. Labour Force of Bulgaria.** The wealth of Bulgaria is the labour of her people. Bulgaria was the first country in Europe to introduce labour conscription. Now it is adopted in almost all European countries. Compulsory labour has much to do with the technical advancement of Bulgaria in recent years:

Year	*Labour conscripts*
1929	16.320
1938	24.309

466 We will take as an example the year 1939. During this year the followind work was accomplished:

ground work for new roads	435.5 km.
stone laying for new roads	249.7 .
extensions and repairs	213.5 .
rectifications or modifications of river beds	13.4 .
retain walls	8.1 .
repair of retain walls	1.4 . .

total number of men-days 1.230.808.

Compulsory labour was responsible for building most of the difficult railroad lines during recent years and especially

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

Fig. 22.

466 during the war period. The largest part, for example, of the construction of the railroad running along the Strouma valley in the direction of Western Thrace or Salonica, as well as the railroad line which goes to Macedonia, through difficult ground work and numerous tunnels with artificial equipment, have been accomplished by the labour of draftees.

THE CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENT

	Number of Associations	Members
Credit Co-operatives	1,940	367,345
Consumers'	142	81,033
Buildings & Dwellers' Co-op.	289	10,160
Mutual furnishing	359	73,740
Insurance Co-op. (mainly for insuring cattle)	1,135	182,835
Producers' Co-op.	289	76,163
Unions & Centrals Co-op.	42	16,198
Total	4,203	807,474

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Of these Societies 3,165 operated in rural districts and 1,038 in towns. 58% of the members belonged to societies established in urban districts and 41% to societies established in rural districts. This figure of 807,474 is certainly excessive, but is to be explained by the fact that the same individual may figure in several co-opetatives, and it is computed that there are only about 600,000 distinct members. The total capital and funds of these societies amounted to 4,347 million leva and deposits to 2,849 millions, their liabilities amounted to 4,456 millions, while their net profit for the year was reported to have reached 110,366,000 leva.

THE OBLIGATORY LABOUR SERVICE

Owing to Art. 65 of the Treaty of Neuilly abolishing military compulsory service in Bulgaria, those attaining military age are now being utilised to carry out various public works. A special law was voted rendering all men between the ages of 20 and 40 liable to serve during a term ot eight continuous months in the labour corps, and subsequently they are liable to be called upon for temporary service for a term of 21 days every year within the communes in which they are domiciled. Exemption from service may be secured through the payment of a

[728] 466

•466 tax, but owing to the poverty of the masses only about 10°/. of those liable to serve avail themselves of this opportunity to affranchise themselves, though the percentage of the older classes which liberate themselves from temporary incorporation for 21 days reaches 20°/. to 25°/.

[461] The aim of the law is not merely economic, but also aims at instilling among the conscripts of the labour corps a better comprehension of their duty towards the community, a sense of solidarity, and also a liking for manual work, and open air living, especially among the intelligentsia, who considered any sort of field work beneath their dignity. Originally the law did not provide for exemption by payment, as M. Stambuliiski, who was its chief inspirer, pursued at the same time, another object, that of humbling and persecuting all his bourgeois opponents, but the representatives of the Entente Powers intervened and succeeded in introducing certain modifications which rendered the application of the law much more lenient.

466 653 The State has derived substantial help from the utilisation of the labour corps, and it must be admitted that the condition of both the railways and roads on the repairing of which the labour corps was largely employed would have been infinitely worse off, since the State would not have been in a position to defray the work accomplished on them.

Between the years 1921 and 1931, the annual contingent of youths called upon to join the labour corps varied between 12,000 and 19,000; all those liable to service were not utilised, there not being a sufficiency of work for all, owing to the lack of resources and absence of a plan. It was for the first time in 1932 that as many as 20,750 were incorporated, the number being increased to 26,000 in 1933. The greater part of these labour conscripts were utilised for the construction of railways and

THE OBLIGACORY LABOUR SERVICE

roads as may be seen from the following table which also gives an estimate of the value of the work accomplished:

Year	Work days employed for the construction of railways and roads	Work days utilised on other work	Total work days	Value of the work carried out in leva
1922	2,271,579	322,131	2,593,710	77,811,210
1923	1,345,936	191,069	1,537,005	93,940,134
1924	1,055,789	112,909	1,168,698	66,058,916
1925	962,361	151,473	1,113,834	75,111,237
1926	710,835	201,225	912,060	68,083,877
1927	1,336,980	234,820	1,571,800	135,450,983
1928	1,310,178	214,299	1,524,477	142,075,936
1929	1,310,166	158,553	1,468,719	154,381,307
1930	1,261,359	190,317	1,451,676	142,082,059
1931	1,236,346	167,893	1,404,239	131,858,836
Total	12,801,529	1,844,689	14,646,218	1,086,854,595

To the labour of these conscripts may be ascribed the construction of some excellent highways traversing the Balkan mountains, such as those between Gabrovo and Shipka, Elena and Sliven, and from Troyan southward along the Boyanski Pass, as well as a road some 50 klm. in length along the banks of the river Kritchim to the hamlet of Duvlen in the Rhodopes. It is reckoned that 49·2% of the total labour was absorbed in the construction and reparation of roads, 3,420 klm. of new roads, as well as 436 bridges, having been constructed, and 2,315 klm. of roads repaired. Railway construction and work on ports absorbed 19.2%, and 21·4% was utilised in industrial enterprises, special workshops having been constructed such as a brick factory, a clothing and shoe factory in the vicinity of Sofia, and a timber exploitation works in the State forest of Titsa, in the region of Varna, where the available timber resources were rationally exploited, sleepers for the railways, pit-props for the

466 653 mines and telegraph poles being prepared, as well as lumber for building purposes. The balance of the available labour was employed in agricultural work, excavations, construction of aerodromes and dams, reparation of thermal bathing establishments, drainage, afforestation, water adduction etc.

The most impressive work undertaken by the labour contingent was the erection of two large dams along the banks of the Danube namely between the mouths of the rivers Isker and Vit, and near the mouth of the river Yantra. The former one 28·3 klm. in length, has secured an area of some 17,000 hectares from the annual floods of the Danube, and the latter which is a massive dam 17 klm. in length, 24 m. wide at its base, and 5 to 7 m. in height, bearing an excellent road on top has served to reclaim 1,100 h. of marsh land and protect another 1,250 h. from floods. The total cost of this last dam at the mouth of the Yantra to the State was 32 million leva.

Certain other workshops which had been opened at Shumen and Radomir as well as certain agricultural enterprises, and cattle ranches have not proved successful and were closed.

466 652 The financial results of the experiment may be gauged by the following table compiled by the Direction of the Labour Service and which coves the whole period of its functionment from its inception to March 31st 1932.

Disbursements cover: salaries and office expenses of the permanent staff, food, medical attendance, clothing, equipment, general expenses, depreciation of machinery etc. Under the heading of receipts figure, the sums paid for exemption from service, proceeds from the sale of various materials, as well as reimbursements by the various ministries of a nominal wage per man, for the number of labour conscripts affected to their services. This last practice was initiated in the financial year 1924/5 in order

THE OBLIGATORY LABOUR SERVICE

that the budget of this department might not be deficitary; the wages per day paid by the various ministries have varied between 30 and 60 leva and are substantially under the average wage of manual workers hired in the open market. It is reckoned that the upkeep of a labour conscrips costs 15 leva per day to the State, and that the value of his work is on an average about 30 leva. If it were not for the subsidy furnished by the various ministries, the scheme would not even be self-supporting, and as no remuneration whatever is given to the labour conscripts whose labour would certainly be worth semething in the open market it would not appear that this plan of employing labour is on a whole economical to the community, though it may be so to the State or the municipalities. As it should be expected, every man cannot be utilised in his profession and as a consequence the output of his work on the particular job he has been affected to is not a record one; as M. I. Detchev, a radical deputy, stated in the Sobranye on Dec. 34, 1926, the work of 14 labour conscripts equals that of one skilled workman.

The data on page 168 do not refer to the temporary service which is carried out by the communes or municipalites independently. The latter have the right to call up every year for twenty one days all men up to the age of 40, and exceptionally up to 50, who are domiciled within their precincts for the purpose of carrying out any public work which has been decided upon. It is estimated that some 800,000 men are liable to this temporary service and if their daily wage be reckoned at 40 leva per man and per day, this would represents a possible saving of 672 million leva a year on the wage bills of the municipalities employing labour and would permit them to undertake public works which otherwise would never have been contemplated owing to the precarious state of their finances.

Years	Receipts from exemptions	Receipts from subsidies paid by Ministries	Receipts from goods sold	Various Receipts	Nett Loss	Gross disbursements
1920—21		16,465			7,475,850	7,492,315
1921—22		2,941,071	1,580,664	37,838	48,709,284 *	53,268,855
1922—23		49,908,210	29,278,321	507,642	98,084,065 *	177,778,237
1923—24		85,463,762	63,757,598	803,678	24,783,318	174,808,356
1924—25	26,202,847	67,223,163	50,340,817	12,785,405		147,384,287
1925—26	36,882,768	80,802,373	66,108,120	10,692,529		182,944,747
1926—27	37,119,522	72,744,526	51,208,024	1,220,288		146,548,629
1927—28	45.542,866	143,751,752	41,389,855	2,524,909		154.388,922
1928—29	77,845,990	173,601,206	50,594,311	8,324,177		164,482,237
1929—30	101 649,332	195,795,776	65,853,521	7,048,642		188,061,303
1930—31	46,169,921	211,843,934	48,699,040	10,169,179		198,413,223
1931—32	35,478,757	184,630,035	46,481,683	9,942,087		173,334,375

* According to a statement by Minister Vassilev in the Sobranye on June 19, 1928 the Direction computes that the loss is smaller, but accounts for the difference by entering a certain sum as extra profits „not figuring in the budget" or, in other words, a subsidy of some sort

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6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
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165 829 War a program of cooperative farming was inaugurated on a voluntary membership basis, the vast majority of farmers were small landowners of the type which once was so characteristic of the Ukraine. As early as August, 1945, the first of a series of decrees was promulgated, to liquidate the hated kulak and incorporate him into the kolkhoz, or State farm, system. At the same time a blueprint of industrialization was drawn, on the [466] basis of the familiar Two- and Five-Year Plans. The blueprint required first of all cheap compulsory labor in quantity. The published legislation outlines the methods by which that labor force was to be obtained. The police received authority "to commit to communities for educational labor, or to a new place of residence, persons guilty of fascist or antidemocratic manifestations." It was also decreed, soon after the seizure of power, that many hundreds of thousands of persons should be "sent to the factories or shifted to industry." On none of these matters was any effort made to maintain secrecy.

[371] 697 466 Soon dams and electric power plants were being constructed in various parts of the country. The exploitation of Bulgaria's very modest coal deposits was greatly intensified. In order to supply the needed labor force, concentration camps were erected in a surprising variety of places. One of the better known is that at Belene, the inmates of which work at digging canals. Here are cooped up many prominent Bulgarian intellectuals, businessmen, and officers of divers political organizations once opposed to Communism. The Communists themselves have advertised widely this camp, where, it is estimated, 9,000 persons are interned under the most primitive penal conditions. If the accounts of prisoners who have escaped from it are to be credited (and there is no reason why they should not be), it is in all truth an infamous place. The methods of committing people to it have been spelled out in carefully devised legislation, which makes no provision for haling anyone before

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
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a court for trial and sentence. The Law on Labor Mobilization of Idlers and Vagrants, originally enacted on April 30, 1946, and subsequently amended announced: 697 466 [671]

Section 1. All Bulgarian nationals of both sexes, between 16 and 50 years of age [45 for women], fit for work but who have taken to idling and vagrancy or who spend most of their time in saloons, coffee shops, bars, pastry shops, and the like, shall be mobilized for compulsory labor.

Section 2. The purpose of the labor mobilization shall be to make the draftees accustomed to useful work, to develop in them a love of socially useful labor, to eradicate their bad habits, and at the same time to utilize their physical energies and their intellectual endowments for the increase of the population and the welfare of the country.

Section 3. The labor of the draftees shall be used on projects of general usefulness, such as road construction, railroad tracks, canals, dams, buildings, levees, river constructions, tillage of government or public farms, work in mines, quarries, factories, workshops and the like, according to the sex and age of the draftees.

The lot of the "draftees" in such camps as those in the Dobrudja, Bulgaria's most fertile area, has been described by persons who have escaped. A typical camp is that for women near the city of Tutrakan. It is a network of primitive barracks in each of which are to be found two rows of wooden bunks, each row in three tiers. The prisoners work on a large State-owned farm. The camp director gives the assignments. For example, the prisoner may be told to dig up such and such an acreage of sugar beets, or to spade a specified amount of soil in preparation for the planting of paprika. The daily wage is 900 grams of black bread. Failure to complete the task causes the ration to be diminished. As a rule each inmate works eleven hours a day. At ten P.M. there is a roll call, after which each prisoner solemnly promises to do everything she possibly can "for the building up of the People's Republic of Bulgaria."

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe
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466 There is an austere puritanical fanaticism about the regulations which is difficult for an American, inured to doing what he pleases, to comprehend.

Virtually all potential foes of the Communist regime in Bulgaria have been sent to such camps, which means that any person who deviates in the slightest degree from the established Communist norm invites the public prosecutor to get on with incarcerating him. It is difficult to believe that the system is as far-flung and well established as it is; but the Communist authorities themselves have made available a substantial amount 162] of information on its extent. There are at least thirty slave-labor camps in Bulgaria, and it has been estimated that at least 500,000 persons have been confined in them during the seven years of Communist rule. Among the inmates have been whole families—men, women, and children. Before we condemn the Bulgarian Churches for cowardly behavior it may be well to ask what we ourselves might have done in the circumstances.

II

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642 Rumania was not fully subordinated to the Communist Party until the close of 1947. On the eve of the invasion of the 769] country, which had been the only one to lend full support to the Nazi cause, young King Michael overthrew the Iron Front government and its strong man, General Antonescu, by a *coup d'état*. The new Government, in which a general also served as Premier, accepted the terms of armistice. Nevertheless by March 6, 1945, the Communists were unmistakably in control, although a fellow traveler, Dr. Petru Groza, was selected to head a government in which they had the upper hand. At the Potsdam Conference the United States, Great Britain, and Russia agreed to sign a treaty of peace with Rumania as soon as a government should be formed which was "broadly repre-